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Credit cards have been the dominant payment method for the electronic commerce retail 
industry.  However, online retailers, especially the small to medium ones, continue to be 
disadvantaged by the seemingly arbitrary bucket pricing strategy implemented by the credit card 
processing companies.  We address the following research question: “Can the credit card 
processors continue to economically justify the use of bucket pricing structure, especially 
considering the increased competition within the industry and from competing payment 
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Electronic commerce (e-commerce) and online retail transactions continue to grow.  A recent 
survey suggests that one third of the online retailers have gained market share from their brick-
and-mortar competitors despite of the depressed economy and the slowing sales growth for the 
retail industry as a whole [Swerdlow, 2009].   Similarly, data on the 2008 online holiday season 
shows that trends in online spending outperformed offline in several key product categories 
[comScore, 2009]. 
Traditionally, credit cards have been the dominant payment method for the Internet retail 
industry.   Online credit card transactions will continue to increase and are predicted to account 
for 40% of the forecasted $268 billion in online transactions by 2013 [Javelin Strategy & 
Research, 2008].  Furthermore, according to many experts, credit cards will continue to be the 
safest option for e-commerce due to the more comprehensive online fraud protection and zero 
liability policies offered by major card issuers [Simon, 2006]. 
Despite the continued success, some analysts predict that in the future online consumers may 
use credit cards less often due to competition from other payment methods such as stored value 
cards and e-mail payments (e.g., eBay’s PayPal). They argue that the gradual decline of online 
credit card payments is primarily due to the fact that the alternative payment options are 
generally cheaper for retailers [Simon, 2006], with Celent analysts noting that credit cards are 
simply too costly relative to other payment options [Celent, 2008].  
The history of the credit card industry goes as far back as 1958 when Bank of America 
Corporation introduced the first bank credit card, BankAmericard.  Within a few years, the 
Interbank Card Association launched a competing card.  BankAmericard later became Visa 
U.S.A., whereas Interbank Card Association developed into MasterCard Worldwide.  In 1971, 
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 BankAmericard established an interchange fee, which was explained as compensation for the 
risk of card-issuing banks, to be paid by the merchant’s bank to the cardholder’s bank.  The fee 
was initially set at 1.95% per transaction.  MasterCard followed suit.  In 1979, National Bancard 
Corp. (Nabanco) sued Visa U.S.A, alleging that setting interchange rates could be considered 
price fixing.  In 1986, a federal appeals court rejected Nabanco’s claim, observing that the card 
industry is nascent, so price-fixing and other antitrust allegations did not hold up. At about the 
same time, Visa and MasterCard began “incentive pricing” of interchange fees to encourage 
merchant adoption of electronic card capture.   
In 1996, retailers filed a class-action lawsuit against Visa and MasterCard challenging the 
“honor all cards” rule, which required merchants accepting any MasterCard and Visa products to 
accept all such products.  In 1998, the U.S. Department of Justice filed antitrust actions against 
MasterCard and Visa over the so-called “exclusionary rules” that prohibited member banks from 
issuing nonbank cards, like those of American Express Co. and Discover Financial Services, 
LLC.  In 2001, a federal court ruled against the bankcard assocations’ exclusionary rules. This 
ruling was later upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.   
In 2005, Visa and MasterCard announced new interchange fee schedules, which tied 
assessments to the types of cards used.  For example, each transaction using cards tied to rewards 
programs were assessed higher interchange rates.  Retailers soon challenged this new fee policy, 
arguing that in many cases the fees equaled or exceeded their profits.  Stories on interchange fees 
and other concerns raised by merchants have continued to appear regularly in the mainstream 
press, including publications such as BusinessWeek, The Wall Street Journal and USA Today.  
To accept credit card payments, retailers use the services of credit card processing 
companies.  The U.S. credit card processing industry is highly automated and highly 
3 
 concentrated, with 40 percent of its $10 billion revenues generated by the top four companies.  
The industry includes fewer than 500 companies. Major companies include First Data 
Corporation, Total System Services, Global Payments, and Bank of America's BA Merchant 
Services.  As services are sold mainly based on cost, the profitability of a credit card processing 
company depends very much on efficient operations.  Large companies have big economies of 
scale in processing and can provide more services, while small companies try to compete by 
specializing in industries and providing custom services. 
Credit card processing companies provide transaction services to merchants that accept credit 
card payments and to banks that issue credit cards.  Services to merchants include authorizing, 
capturing, and settling merchants’ credit and debit card transactions, and handling chargebacks 
(which occur when a consumer disputes a charge and charges it back to the merchant). In 
addition, credit card processing companies also sell or lease point-of-sale (POS) 
terminals. Services to card issuers include transaction authorization and posting, statement 
generation and printing, and card embossing.  Large credit card processing companies provide 
services to both sides of the transaction, i.e., both merchant and card issuing services; whereas 
small companies usually offer either one of the services, and may specialize in particular markets 
such as retail cards or credit unions. 
There are two types of fees involved in credit card processing.  The first type is the 
interchange fee, which is set by the credit card networks and split between the networks and the 
credit card issuing banks. The interchange fee consists of a percentage of the transaction amount 
plus a fixed per-transaction fee. The exact percentage varies according to a set of specific criteria 
which include the type of credit card, the type of product or service purchased, the card issuer, 
and other factors (e.g., see [Visa, 2009]).  The second type of fee is the markup charged by the 
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 credit card processing company that serves the merchant (or the merchant’s bank, i.e., the bank 
that provides the merchant account, allowing the merchant to accept credit cards).  This 
additional fee, which goes to the merchant’s bank, is known in the credit card processing 
industry as merchant discount. 
The vast majority of merchant’s banks operate on a tiered pricing structure.  Tiered merchant 
accounts have a base rate called the qualified rate.  In addition, there are additional tiers with 
different levels of surcharge added to the qualified rate, resulting in different final rates for 
different tiers.  These different tiers are referred to as rate buckets or simply buckets. Merchant’s 
banks have the ability to dictate which rate bucket the various credit card payment transactions 
will qualify to. This makes it difficult for a merchant to accurately compare rates and fees from 
different merchant’s banks.   
A simpler and more transparent structure is the interchange plus pricing, where the 
merchants pay the exact interchange fee plus a flat markup to their merchant’s banks. Unlike 
tiered pricing that can have numerous (as many as 12 or more) rate categories, interchange plus 
pricing only recognizes two rates: the interchange markup percentage and an authorization fee.  
Despite its simplicity, interchange plus pricing has been available mostly to merchants the 
process high volumes of credit card sales each month.  This has put smaller online retailers at a 
disadvantage because they have to resort to the less desirable tiered pricing structure. 
In this paper, we will try to address the following research question: “Can merchant’s banks 
continue to economically justify the use of bucket pricing structure, especially considering the 
increased competition within the industry and from competing payment options?”  We will use 





It is common to see different buyers to pay different prices for the same products or services.  
In the airline industry, for example, it is almost always the case that different passengers on the 
same flight have paid different airfares for the same cabin class and service.  Tiered pricing (or 
differential pricing) is considered as an efficient and reasonable response to the presence of 
economies of scale [Frank, 1983].  The basic idea is that economic efficiency requires that 
buyers pay prices that equal to the marginal costs of the products they purchase.  However, when 
there are economies of scale, the cost of producing the last unit is less than the average cost of 
producing all units.  Consequently, a firm that charges all buyers a price equal to the marginal 
cost would not be able to cover its total production cost.  An alternative would be to set the price 
equal to the average cost; however, some price-sensitive buyers would likely be discouraged 
from purchasing the product.  A better alternative would be to charge different prices to different 
buyers.  In this case, if the firm could charge the price-sensitive buyers a price close to marginal 
cost and the other (less price-sensitive) buyers a higher price, then it would be able to cover its 
total cost. 
The tiered pricing approach is clearly preferable to the alternative of setting a single price for 
all buyers in the present of economies of scale.  However, when production exhibits constant 
returns (i.e., when marginal cost and average cost are the same), theoretically only in the 
presence of monopoly power will different buyers pay different prices for the same product. A 
firm that has market power and can segment its buyers into separate markets will be able to 
enhance its revenues by charging higher prices to relatively less price-sensitive buyers, and lower 
prices to those whose demands are more elastic [Frank, 1983; Salop, 1979; Spence, 1976].  In 
practice, differential pricing may also result from market imperfections, which include 
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 incomplete information, irrational brand loyalties on the part of consumers, high transaction 
costs, and numerous legal and practical barriers.  This kind of differential pricing is termed 
discriminatory pricing because it does not reflect real differences in production costs [Salop and 
Stiglitz, 1977; Shilony, 1977; Varian, 1980; Wilde and Schwartz, 1979]. 
Tiered pricing has been discussed and analyzed within various contexts in different 
industries, which include airline [e.g., Frank, 1983]; agricultural [e.g., Suzuki et al., 1994], 
advertising [e.g., Shen, 2002]; pharmaceutical [e.g., Danzon and Towse, 2003]; water resources 
[e.g., Brill et al., 1997; Glennon et al., 2005]; and academic journal industries [Bergstrom and 
Bergstrom, 2004]. 
In the context of information goods and digital product market, tiered or differential pricing 
has been used to explain product versioning.  Shapiro and Varian (1998) maintain that versioning 
allows a firm to sell its information goods at a higher price to customers with higher willingness-
to-pay, generating a large margin for the firm. In addition, it also enables the firm to sell the 
goods at a much lower price to consumers with lower willingness-to-pay due to the fact that 
information goods have a near zero marginal cost of production.  In order to set different prices, 
however, the firm needs to make the features of the low-priced version of the product somewhat 
less attractive that those of the high-priced version.  
In the context of website market, Riggins (2002) develops a differential pricing model to 
examine the monopolist's choice of content quality and price for a fee-based site targeted at high-
type consumers (i.e., consumers with high willingness-to-pay) and the content quality level for a 
sponsored site offered free to both low- and high-type consumers. He shows how a reduction in 
the potential for advertising revenues results in lower content quality on the free site, but permits 
the seller to raise the fee charged to high-type consumers. In addition, the seller can increase 
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 profits by making ads more attractive to either high- or low-type consumers, but rarely both at 
the same time.  
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